Act of State Doctrine: Revived but Suspended by Paul, Roland A.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE:
REVIVED BUT SUSPENDED
ROLAND A. PAuL t
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
In 1892, as was the custom in those days in Latin America,
revolution raged in Venezuela. The civil war went well for the revo-
lutionaries; their general, Jose Manuel Hernandez, occupied Ciudad
Bolivar on August 13, 1892. American citizens even then left their
homeland occasionally. One such American, George F. Underhill,
fortuitously was operating the waterworks in Ciudad Bolivar just when
it fell to General Hernandez. The General, not surprisingly, required
Underhill to continue operating those facilities for the benefit of the
revolutionary forces.
A few years later,1 after returning to the United States, Underhill
brought a lawsuit against Hernandez 2 for false imprisonment and
assault and battery in connection with the events at Ciudad Bolivar.
Ultimately the United States Supreme Court, in affirming judgment
for the defendant, declared that:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the inde-
pendence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be ob-
tained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.'
Although the holding was laden with references to the proper conduct
of war, Underhill v. Hernandez has generally been recognized as the
genesis of the act of state doctrine, the subject of the present Article.4
The doctrine was applied by the Court again in 1909. In
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,5 Mr. Justice Holmes ex-
t A.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Member, New
York Bar.
1 In the meantime, the United States had recognized the revolutionary govern-
ment espoused by Hernandez as the legitimate government of Venezuela.
2 Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
3 168 U.S. at 252.
4 Earlier intimations of the concept can be found in Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 293 (1808); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812) ; and The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336 (1822),
all relating to the seizure of vessels.
5213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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plained and justified the act of state doctrine in terms of his well-known
positivist theory of law.' The Court refused to consider a charge that
the defendant had conspired with the Costa Rican Government to
deprive the plaintiff of its plantation and railroad. In 1918, in the
related cases of Oetien v. Central Leather Co.7 and Ricaud v. American
Metal Co.,8 involving property which had turned up in the United
States after being taken by General Carranza's commanders during the
Mexican Civil War of 1913, the Supreme Court accepted the Mexican
seizures as legally valid and binding. In addition to the retroactive
effect of this country's de jure recognition of General Carranza's
Government, the Court relied on the Underhill proposition that the
redress of grievances at the hands of a foreign sovereign acting within
its own territory must be had, if at all, through diplomatic channels or
the courts of that sovereign, not through the courts of this country.'
The Court insisted in Oetjen that review of sovereign acts by the
courts of another country "would very certainly 'imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.' "-0 It
added that even a review of the taking through application of the
rules of international law was not available in American courts.
Although the doctrine was referred to in passing in Shapleigh v.
Mier," United States v. Belmont,' and United States v. Pink,'" and
followed frequently in the lower courts,14 it did not reappear as central
and controlling in any decision of the Supreme Court until last year in
the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'5
6 [I]t is a contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is
unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares
by its conduct to be desirable and proper. It does not, and foreign courts
cannot, admit that the influences were improper or the results bad. It makes
the persuasion lawful by its own act. The very meaning of sovereignty is that
the decree of the sovereign makes law.
Id. at 358.
7246 U.S. 297 (1918).
8 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
9 The Supreme Court did not lable the "act of state" doctrine as such until Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
10 246 U.S. at 304.
11299 U.S. 468 (1937).
12301 U.S. 324 (1937).
13 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
14 See, e.g., Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962); Bernstein v. Van Hyeghen Freres Societe Anonyme,
163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947) ; United States ex rel. Von
Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947); Banco de Espana v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940); The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276 (2d Cir.
1920); Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367 (2d Cir. 1918); Eastern States Petroleum
Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y 1939) ; Holzer v. Deutsche
Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938) ; Dougherty v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); M.
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
15 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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The doctrine, however, was given signal treatment in Bernstein
v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 8 involving Nazi confiscation of Jewish
property. There the Second Circuit adhered to the act of state rule
until the State Department, responding to an invitation from Judge
Hand,' 7 informed the plaintiff's attorneys that it was State Depart-
ment policy "to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of
Nazi officials." ' Thereupon, tho Second Circuit, per curiam,
rescinded its earlier mandate to the district court and allowed that
court to pass upon the validity of the Nazi decree of confiscation.
The pre-Sabbatino "act of state" doctrine is open to dual inter-
pretation. Some courts appear to say that the existence of local
"law"--i.e., a legislative or executive act-in a sovereign state pre-
cludes the existence of any separate body of rules through which a
court in another country may judge the validity of the local "law"
in question. This seems to have been Mr. Justice Holmes' view of
the matter in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. However, the
language in several other cases suggests that there is no juridical
barrier to review by a domestic court of the act of another sovereign,
but that in the interests of this country's foreign affairs, courts should
not involve themselves in such questions. United States v. Pink,"9 for
example, gave such an interpretation to Oetjen and Underhill. Despite
such ambiguity in its underpinnings, the act of state doctrine in its
application had. run a rather consistent course, with Bernstein
the only significant exception. A reasonably tidy stage was set for
Sabbatino.
II. THEE Sabbatino CASE AND THE AMENDMENT
In retaliation against the United States' reduction of that portion
of its sugar quota allotted to Cuba, Castro's Government, on August 6,
1960, nationalized the Cuban property of twenty-six American com-
panies, of which one was the sugar producer Compania Azucarera
Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (CAV)." ° Meanwhile, a shipment of
CAV sugar was being loaded aboard a vessel at the Cuban port of
16163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), accord, Bernstein v.
N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954), amending per curiam 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
17163 F.2d at 251.
'8 Dep't State Press Release No. 296, April 27, 1949, 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592
(1949) ; see 210 F.2d at 376.
19 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
2 0 Although CAV had been incorporated in Cuba, over 90% of its stockholders
were United States' nationals.
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Jucaro under contracts of sale between CAV and the American sugar
broker, Farr, Whitlock & Co. Only after Farr-Whitlock had re-
negotiated these same contracts with the Cuban Government was the
sugar permitted to leave for its destination, Casablanca. Thereupon,
the Government of Cuba, through its financial representative, Banco
Nacional de Cuba, sent the bills of lading to New York for negotiation.
By rapid legal maneuvers, Farr-Whitlock managed to obtain the bills
of lading from Banco Nacional's representative in New York,
negotiate them, obtain payment for the shipment of sugar, and then
pay over the proceeds to Peter Sabbatino, who had been appointed as
receiver for CAV.
Banco Nacional brought suit in the Southern District of New
York against Farr-Whitlock for conversion of the bills of lading and
their proceeds, and against Sabbatino for an injunction to prevent him
from exercising jurisdiction over the sums paid to him. The district
court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the act of state doctrine
was inapplicable in the presence of a violation of international law. It
found three distinct bases for such a violation: (1) the Cuban
decree was not reasonably related to a public purpose, but rather was
issued as an act of retaliation against this country; (2) the decree was
discriminatory; and (3) it failed to provide adequate compensation.2'
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that certain messages from the
State Department to counsel in this and a similar pending case made
the act of state doctrine inapplicable, and that the Cuban decree did
violate international law because it combined inadequate compensation
with a retaliatory purpose and a discriminatory result. 22
The Supreme Court reversed, and it remanded the case to the
district court with the anticipated result that the funds formerly held
in the receivership would be paid to the Alien Property Custodian, the
present holder of all Cuban assets in the United States. The Court's
opinion resolved a number of significant questions: (1) despite her
break in diplomatic relations with the United States, Cuba could main-
tain an action in the courts of the United States; (2) the act of state
doctrine, although not required either by the provisions of the Con-
stitution or by the principles of international law, was a part of our
federal common law binding on state and federal courts alike; (3) the
proper execution of the foreign policy of this country by the political
branches, as well as progress toward the rule of law among nations,
was best served by precluding the judicial branch from examining "the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign
21193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
22 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the
time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law"; and (4) a
foreign sovereign could invoke the act of state doctrine even as a party-
plaintiff and thereby obtain affirmative relief. 4
The Court itself certainly would not have considered its decision
in Sabbatino an instance of judicial abstention or abdication. Rather,
the majority quoted from the Ricaud opinion as to the nature of the
act of state doctrine: "To accept a ruling authority and to decide ac-
cordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an
exercise of it." 25 It is true that in Sabbatino the Court did adjudicate
the controversy between the parties and did apply a law, the Cuban
decree. That the result was in favor of the plaintiff demonstrates that,
in one sense of the term, there was no abstention in Sabbatino.
Nonetheless, in another sense, the application of the act of state
doctrine here, as in the earlier act of state cases, could still be con-
sidered a form of abstention. 6 In the ordinary choice of law situation,
whether between the laws of two territorial jurisdictions, such as two
states, or between overlapping jurisdictions, such as state and federal
authority, the court is free to inquire into any aspect of the relation
between either contending body of law and the subject matter of the
lawsuit; and where two bodies of law happen to apply to the same
subject, to reconcile the two according to their respective weight and
substance. But under the act of state doctrine, the court makes the
choice of law depend upon foreign policy considerations which prohibit
it from even verbalizing the precepts of the rejected alternative. The
questions of relationship and priority are never reached. The act of
state doctrine is similar in this respect to the now limited doctrine of
"political questions." 17
The story of Sabbatino does not end, however, with the decision
rendered by the Supreme Court. On October 2, 1964, Congress pro-
2 376 U.S. at 428.
24 The Court also ruled that the refusal of American courts to effectuate the
penal and revenue laws of another State or Country did not extend to a fully executed
decree of expropriation, and that it was not proper for American courts to pass upon
the validity of a foreign sovereign's act under the law of that foreign state.
2z 246 U.S. at 309, quoted in 376 U.S. at 418.
26 See, e.g., Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino,
64 COLUm. L. REv. 805, 822 (1964). Compare RESTATEMENT, FoaEGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §75(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Jessup, Has
the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946) ;
Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the 'SuggestioW and Certificate of the American State
Department, 24 BraT. YB. INTL L. 116, 146-47 (1947).
27 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
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vided that no American court should, because of the act of state doc-
trine, fail to apply international law in any case commencing before
January 1, 1966, in which a confiscation or other taking by a foreign
state occurring after January 1, 1959, was involved, unless: (1) the
foreign act was not contrary to international law; (2) the claimant's
right was based upon a 180-day or less irrevocable letter of credit issued
prior to the confiscation; or (3) the executive branch specifically in-
voked the act of state doctrine by filing with the court a suggestion to
that effect. And to make its intent abundantly clear, Congress told
the courts directly in the legislation that its view of international law
included prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
Thus, for a brief period, American courts will be allowed to pass
judgment in accordance with international law (as interpreted by
Congress) upon certain acts committed by foreign states. It may
well turn out that the only cases in which the amendment will ever
be applied are Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,' and the other
pending cases involving Cuba on which adjudication had been post-
poned awaiting the outcome of the Sabbatino case. However, the
Senate-House conference report states that the expiration date for the
amendment was accepted on the understanding that the matter would be
fully reviewed during the next Congress to determine the need for
permanent legislation in this area."
28 Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1013:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party
including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law,
including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in
this subsection: Prozdded, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable
(1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to inter-
national law or with respect to a claim of title or other right acquired
pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days dura-
tion issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other
taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines
that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case
by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this
effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court, or (3) in any case in
which the proceedings are commenced after January 1, 1966.
29This being the current name of the Sabbatino case on remand in the Southern
District of New York.
ao H.R. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964). In its dash toward ad-
journment the House did not have sufficient time in its 1964 session to make an
adequate appraisal of the amendment originally proposed by Senator Hickenlooper
for reversing the Sabbatino opinion. The amendment as finally enacted was a hastily-
drawn compromise. See ibid.; H.R. 11380, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (f) (1964) (S.
Amend. 39, Sept. 24, 1964). See also S. REP. No. 1188, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1964).
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III. A RATIONALE: THE REQUIREMENTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
The major theme of the Court's opinion in Sabbatino was the
insistence that the executive branch not be hampered in its handling of
foreign policy by a judicial decision as to the validity of an expropria-
tion. The Court saw dire consequences in any such decision: (1) a
holding against the validity of a foreign act might insult the sovereign
committing the act or a third sovereign similarly situated and thus
render less favorable a possible diplomatic settlement of the claims held
by all American citizens; or (2) a judicial decision in favor of the
validity of the decree or a judicial pronouncement that international
law was unclear on the point was likely to undercut the State Depart-
ment's contentions with respect to the expropriating decree and thus
render more difficult efforts at a general settlement. Furthermore, the
Court felt that the interests of diplomacy as well as the proper role
of the courts demanded application of the act of state doctrine without
a requirement of its prior affirmative invocation by the executive
branch.31 We proceed to examine these contentions.
A. Effects of Judicial Invalidation of a Foreign Act
Even if an American court should rule a foreign act to be in
violation of international law, the offense to the sensitivities of the
expropriating country in most cases pales in comparison with the other
insults which the United States might, and often does, hurl at the
expropriator. The Cuban situation is illustrative. Already the State
Department had denounced the Cuban seizures as violations of inter-
national law.' The President had placed an embargo on all United
States trade with Cuba.3" The Deputy Attorney General of the United
States had asserted in open court that the seizures were in violation
of international law. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 coupled with
the 1962 missile crisis removed more than a little sting from a possible
judicial decision contrary to the Castro regime.
There are, to be sure, cases of expropriation not evoking the
extreme animosity of the Cuban-American vendetta. To provide for
these the act of state doctrine could be modified to permit a court to
31 The Court felt constrained to justify its application of the act of state doctrine
at some length-it did not merely rely upon earlier precedent. Unpersuasive efforts
have been made to distinguish Sabbatino from the cases of Underhill, Ricaud, and
Oetjen. See, e.g., 376 U.S. at 442-44 n.2 (White, J., dissenting); 1 OPPENHEIM,
IxTERNATI NAL LAW § 115ab, at 268 n.2 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
32 Dep't State Press Release No. 397, July 16, 1960, 45 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 171
(1960).3 Proclamation No. 3447, Feb. 6, 1962, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). ""
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review the validity of a foreign decree only when there is present at
the time of judgment any one of certain objective indicia of cool rela-
tions between the United States and the other country. These could
include the severance of diplomatic relations, the freezing of assets in
this country under section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 4
the embargo of trade between the two countries,3 5 and the suspension
of foreign aid under the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act. 6
In view of the State Department's present acceptance of this
amendment, 7 the policy reasons are not clear for avoiding a judicial
determination contrary to a particular expropriation. The possibility
of such a judicial decision would offer the State Department yet
another argument to make to a foreign government considering ex-
propriation, while the effect of such a judicial decision, once made,
would usually be no harsher than action taken by the United States
Government pursuant to the Hickenlooper Amendment.
Provided that courts were also to give great weight to specific
requests from the State Department for judicial abstentions, embarrass-
ment to this country's foreign policy under such a modified act of state
doctrine would be most unlikely. Indeed, the frequent refusal of
American courts to recognize the validity of foreign confiscations in
the past, to the extent that those confiscations purported to affect titles
to property or other legal rights beyond the territorial borders of the
3455 Stat. 839 (1941), 50A U.S.C. §5(b) (1958).
35 See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(a), 75 Stat 444 (1961), as
amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (a) (Supp. V, 1964).
3676 Stat. 260 (1962), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1) (Supp. V, 1964),
as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (1) (Supp. 1964) :
The President shall suspend assistance to the government of any country
to which assistance is provided under this chapter or any other act when the
government of such country or any government agency or subdivision within
such country on or after January 1, 1962-
(A) has nationalized or expropriated or seized ownership or control
of property owned by any United States citizen or by any corporation,
partnership, or association not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned
by United States citizens . . .
and such country, government agency or government subdivision fails within
a reasonable time . . . to take appropriate steps, which may include arbi-
tration, to discharge its obligations under international law toward such
citizens or entity, including speedy compensation for such property in con-
vertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof, as required by
international law ....
The United States suspended aid to Ceylon under this statute on February 8,
1963. 48 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 328-29 (1963).
37 See Hearings on H.R. 10327, 10536, 10720, 12259 and 12260 Before the Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46 (1964) (comments of State Department Acting Legal
Adviser Meeker); 110 CoNrG. Rxc. 18944 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964) (remarks of
Senator Hickenlooper).
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expropriating state, does not appear to have jeopardized our relations
abroad. 38
As to the State Department's efforts at settling all private Ameri-
can claims arising out of a particular governmental taking, again there
is serious question whether an unfavorable judicial determination
would have any significant effect on the State Department's task of
negotiating a settlement, especially since the State Department would
have the right, at least at any time before final judgment, to seek
judicial abstention in a particular case.39  Furthermore, claims negotia-
tion, although important work, is not of the same significance as
those matters of foreign policy which bear directly upon the national
security of this country, those matters to which extreme deference
must be paid. Foreign affairs are not all of the same magnitude. The
Sabbatino Court failed to make this clear.
The claims negotiating work of the State Department has not
been insignificant. In 1917 Mexico nationalized all its land and
water resources including those owned by Americans, thus creating
claims on the part of American citizens in the amount of 350 million
dollars. In 1941 these claims were settled through a commitment by
Mexico to pay 40 million dollars in annual installments. In 1938
Mexico seized all alien-owned oil properties. An Arfierican claim of
260 million dollars was settled four years later for approximately 24
million dollars plus three percent interest.4"
Settlements for the expropriations in Eastern Europe which fol-
lowed World War II were of a similar order. American claims against
38 See, e.g., Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 273 App. Div.
224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43, aff'd per curiam, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948) ; Second
Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552 (1925) (dictum); Vladikavkazsky Ry. v.
New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934).
39The overall amount of American claims in the negotiated settlement would,
of course, be reduced by the amount of the private litigant's recovery in court. Like-
wise the funds recovered by the successful private litigant would not be included in
the amount of frozen assets of the expropriating country held in the United States.
Cf. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka Natl Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 118-19, 222
N.Y.S.2d 128, 136 (1961) (dictum). If, on the other hand, the private litigant, as
a result of the application of the act of state doctrine, had not been successful in court,
and the amount in dispute had become part of the frozen assets of the expropriator,
and these frozen assets were distributed among all claimants under a general settle-
ment, the result under American notions of private property would be tantamount to
the taking of one man's property to reimburse partially each of the other persons
similarly injured. This might have a superficial appeal as an equitable sharing of the
loss, but it seems contrary to basic concepts of private property in this country.
Furthermore, in one man's hands the funds recovered may appear substantial, but if
distributed among all claimants may well be de minimis. Cf. Timberg, Expropriation
Measures and State Trading, 1961 AmERIcAN Soc'y INTERNATIONAL L. PROCEDINGS
113, 120.
40 Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate, and Effective": A Universal Standard
of Compensation?, 30 FoRDHAm L. REv. 727, 740-41 (1962). By waiting until 1947
the British were apparently able to strike a better bargain for their petroleum interests.
For claims about equivalent to those held by United States citizens, the United King-
dom was able to recover $130 million for its citizens. Id. at 741.
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Rumania totaling 84,729,291 dollars were settled in March 1960 for
24,526,370 dollars. However, all but 2.5 million dollars of this settle-
ment was paid out of frozen assets held in this country, for which
Rumania's consent was hardly necessary.4 Similarly, an agreement
was reached with Bulgaria in 1963 by which claims totaling 4,600,000
dollars were settled by the application of 3,143,398 dollars in frozen
assets and the further Bulgarian contribution of 400,000 dollars.'
Against Yugoslavia, American citizens held claims totaling an esti-
mated 150 million dollars. The United States in 1948 returned gold
to Yugoslavia which had been sent to the United States for safe-
keeping during the war. Of a total of 46,800,000 dollars in gold
involved, the United States was authorized to liquidate 17 million
dollars in settlement of American claims against Yugoslavia. 3 Finally,
in July 1960 Poland agreed to pay to the United States some 40
million dollars over a period of twenty years and to negotiate directly
with American citizens holding Polish Government bonds amounting
to 45 million dollars. In return the United States released 1 million
dollars of Polish assets in the United States. It should be added that
during the period 1958-1962 the United States was lending Poland
61 million dollars and selling to her farm produce at low prices totaling
293 million dollars.44 And shortly after the agreement on American
claims, this country accorded Poland most-favored-nation tariff
treatment.
45
Two examples from Latin America demonstrate approximately
the same degree of success. In 1952 Bolivia seized three foreign-owned
tin mines. In 1960 she agreed to pay full compensation out of tin
revenues, but only after the United States promised to buy 15,000
tons of tin at world market prices from the nationalized companies and
to double its Point Four aid. When tin revenues fell below eighty
cents per pound on the world market, Bolivia was relieved of her
commitment. 6 In 1962, when one of the Brazilian states took from
a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
41 Christenson, The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agreement of
March 30,1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 617, 621-22 (1961) ; see Agreement With Rumania,
March 30, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451.42 Dep't State Press Release No. 354, July 2, 1963, 49 Dp'VT STATE BULL. 138
(1963). In fact under domestic United States law some of the claims had already
been paid before the international settlement was reached. Ibid.; see 69 Stat 562
(1955), 22 U.S.C. §§ 1631-41q (1958).
43 Dawson & Weston, supra note 40, at 743-44; see Agreement With Yugoslavia,
July 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 2658 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1803.
44Dawson & Weston, supra note 40, at 745; see Agreement With Poland, July
16, 1960, [19601 11 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545.
45 See Tyler, Department Supports Discretionary Authority for President on
Trade with Poland and Yugoslavia, 48 DE,'T STATE BULL. 947, 948, 949 (1963).
46 Dawson & Weston, supra note 40, at 745 n.97.
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holdings valued at 6-8 million dollars, the Brazilian Government
agreed to grant the company a loan equal to 80 percent of the value
of the property seized. IT&T, however, was committed to invest this
amount in one of its manufacturing subsidiaries in Brazil.
47
Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out for the Sabbatino Court that
countries expropriate for many reasons, "political and ideological as
well as economic." " Countries settle claims arising out of ex-
propriations for just as many reasons. Clearly, the settlement with
Yugoslavia in 1948, the settlements with Rumania and Poland in
1960, and even the Litvinov Agreement with the Soviet Union in
1933 49 stemmed mainly from each country's view of its own national
interest and little from its concept as to the requirements of inter-
national law. In such a context a judicial decision either for or against
a particular seizure should have slight or no effect upon the situation.
At the very least it can be said that the risk of jeopardizing some future
diplomatic settlement is slight enough to be outweighed by the obliga-
tion of the court to work justice in the case before it and the desirability
of fostering a rule of law among nations.
A judicial decision adverse to an expropriation would be no more
harmful in other regards. The Court feared that it could embarrass
our relations with a third country involved in similar expropriations.
Here, as elsewhere in the opinion, the Court's observation suggests its
acceptance of a rule of decision which subordinates the development of
international law to the Court's conception of the national interest,50 for
by hypothesis the third country would have been as guilty of violating
international law as the expropriating nation involved in the immediate
lawsuit. The Court's position as applied to third countries similarly
situated is no stronger than it is with respect to our relations with the
country committing the immediate expropriation. Again, it would
seem that requiring the State Department affirmatively to seek judicial
abstention would be sufficient protection for the national interest in
this respect.
The Court maintained that judicial relief was only limited relief,
whereas a diplomatic settlement was general relief.5 But that depends
upon one's point of view. Judicial decisions can work complete justice
as to the subject matter before the court, which may or may not
represent a substantial recovery to the injured litigant. Claims nego-
47 See N.Y. Times, April 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
48 376 U.S. at 435.
49 Dep't of State Publication No. 528, 1933, [1933] 2 FoREIGN RE. U.S. 805-14.
GO At the end of the section of the opinion now under discussion, the Court, how-
ever, asserts without explanation that its opinion will contribute to the growth of
international law as well as to the national interest. 376 U.S. at 437.
51 See p. 697 supra.
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tiations, on the other hand, often extend over many years and, if
successful at all, result in reimbursement only after the property ex-
propriated has been written off as a total loss. Such reimbursement
is often a mere fraction of the value of the property seized. To call
such relief "general" is misleading to say the least.
Finally, in regard to decisions adverse to an expropriation, the
Court discounted any deterrent effect such decisions might have on
future expropriations. The Court's attitude here appears somewhat
inconsistent with its attribution of a strong "insulting" effect to such
judgments. It is rather hard for the Court to have it both ways:
judicial decisions frustrate settlements but in no way deter expropria-
tions. It is more reasonable to assume that judicial decisions adverse
to expropriations are likely either to have little effect on both settle-
ments and expropriations or are likely both to interfere with possible
settlements and to deter future expropriations. Under either alterna-
tive judicial abstention is inadvisable. If judgments have no significant
effect on settlements or expropriations, the Court might as well render
justice in the case before it and, in so doing, make a contribution to the
rule of law among nations. If judgments are likely to affect both
settlements and expropriations, deterring an expropriation is preferable
to permitting settlement after expropriation, since deterrence is com-
plete justice (i.e., the owners' property is saved in toto) whereas settle-
ments work only partial justice--often a very small part. Of course
it is unclear in the abstract how much property will be saved from
would-be expropriators and how much a settlement will be diminished
as a result of judicial decisions. The only reasonable conclusion is
that any expectation would involve such unresolved conjecture that
the Court could not fairly have based its decision on the assumption
that, if the Court abstained from judgments adverse to expropriations,
more property would more likely be recovered through settlements than
saved from expropriation. 2
B. Effects of Judicial Affirmation of a Foreign Act
A holding that the Cuban expropriation was not inconsistent with
international law would certainly not have been an insult to Cuba
52 Although, in the body of the opinion, the Court adopted the position that
deterrence was unlikely, in two footnotes it gave some support to the contrary propo-
sition. 376 U.S. at 431 n.36, 433 n.38. In these footnotes the Court stated that adverse
judicial decisions might disincline persons from bringing expropriated property into
this country, but would not deter expropriations if other markets could be found for
the goods. But what about those products for which other markets cannot be found?
The United States is the predominant market for many items. A rule of international
law against certain types of expropriations, if followed by the United States and a
number of other countries, could effectively close a large share of the world market
to expropriators of many types of products. Surely this would have a deterrent
effect in at least some cases.
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and, therefore, would not have affected in any significant way those
matters of high foreign policy which directly bear upon the security
of this country.5 3  The Court believed, however, that such a holding
might undercut the State Department's efforts to reach a claims settle-
ment." But such an undercutting was not inevitable-a skillful opinion
might have avoided it by pointing out that even though the rules of
international law did not require prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation for American citizens whose property had been taken, ade-
quate compensation for any taking of private property was not only the
well-known policy of this country, but also a concept of justice held by
many persons and many nations throughout the world. If a par-
ticular country wants our friendship, it will respect our principles and
policies to the extent that it is able; and if it does not care for our
friendship, at least in the present international situation, it will prob-
ably not pay us regardless of the rules of international law. As indi-
cated above,55 the settlement of claims today is based upon what each
country believes to be prudent in its own self-interest, a concept little,
if at all, connected with what anyone asserts to be the precepts of
international law. Perhaps most important, a rule of judicial decision
that failure to pay "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation is
no violation of international law such as to create a right of recovery
(or cognizable defense) in court is not necessarily inconsistent with
another rule of international law which would recognize an obligation
on the part of an expropriating country to accommodate the victims
of expropriation to some extent through diplomatic channels at a future
date.56
Another point to consider is this: a decision of a court, in
Sabbatino the Highest Court, should not be based on the necessity of
protecting another agency in its exposition of erroneous legal theories.
If what the State Department asserts to be the law is not what our
courts believe it to be, should the State Department be allowed to
continue in error? This was another of those places in the Sabbatino
opinion where the Court seems to subordinate the development of law
53 In fact, it would seem that the effect on foreign policy from such a decision
would hardly have been different from the effect of the actual decision in Sabbatino.
54The Court believed, perhaps rightly, that it not only had to avoid a direct
refutation of the State Department's position, but also had to avoid even casting
doubt upon that position by pronouncing the rules of international law to be cloudy
on the relevant point. 376 U.S. at 433. But earlier in the Sabbatino opinion itself
the Court took the position that the rules of international law regarding expropri-
ations were far from clear. 376 U.S. at 428-30. Thus, the Court committed in fact
the very error it dreaded so much in the abstract.
65 See text accompanying notes 48-49 spra.
56 Even Communist countries appear to recognize some obligation in the direction
of compensation for victims of expropriation, although the relief is neither prompt
nor adequate. See text accompanying notes 41-46, 73-74 supra.
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to a so-called national interest. If the State Department's past inter-
pretation of international law was mistaken, possibly that Department
in the future would be more effective, and certainly more candid, if it
decided to emphasize the fact that confiscation can lead to the loss of
investment capital from abroad or decided to base its future arguments
upon a concept of friendship between nations, mutual respect for each
other's policies, and a code of morality not yet embodied in current
concepts of international law.
Congress has now reversed the Court's refusal to limit application
of the act of state doctrine to cases where the State Department affirma-
tively invokes it. The Court's variant result rests on a number of
unconvincing propositions. First, the majority was reluctant to reject
the Government's argument in court that such an arrangement would
"work serious inroads on the maximum effectiveness of United States
diplomacy." " However, no one has cited a single historical instance
in which the State Department could not have come forward in a par-
ticular litigation to seek a result favorable to a foreign power.5 As to
the Court's belief that the timing required of the State Department
might be inopportune for affirmative invocation, the Court here, as
elsewhere, appears to have been overly solicitous of the role of a State
Department whose operations do not in fact require such protection.
The Court even gave great weight to the possibility that adverse
domestic consequences might ensue from the State Department's taking
an official position. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent, how-
ever, the domestic position of the State Department, that is, its political
image, is an inadequate basis upon which to ground a rule of decision. 9
Finally, the Court doubted "whether the examination of validity by
the judiciary should depend on an educated guess by the Executive as
to probable result . ... " " Although all of the Court's other grounds
for not requiring affirmative invocation were intended to protect the
State Department, this final argument was directed toward benefiting
the courts. But the Court here was advancing no weightier argument
than that no loaf was better than half, i.e., that the role of the judiciary
was better served by complete abdication in favor of the executive (no
examination of validity in any case) than by a partial deference to the
executive.
57 376 U.S. at 436.
58 The State Department has many times "suggested" the sovereign immunity
of foreign states in lawsuits against such states. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945); United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Compare the case of the three Kenya students charged with felonious assault. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 20, 1964, p. 10, cols. 7-8.
59 See 376 U.S. at 468-69 (White, J., dissenting).
6o Id. at 436.
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The opinion resolved all doubts in favor of avoiding even the
most tenuous possibility of embarrassment to the State Department.
The Supreme Court certainly has not shown such deference in other
cases touching upon matters of national security.61  A rule of decision
might have been drafted which would have more carefully balanced
the proper roles of the judiciary and the executive."'
IV. ANOTHER RATIONALE: THE POSTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Sabbatino decision rests on double rationales. The first con-
cerns the needs of the State Department. The second, not entirely
separate from the first, involves the present nature of international law
with respect to expropriations. The Court felt that judicial determina-
tions regarding confiscation were inappropriate in view of (1) the
wide division in world opinion as to the limits on a state's authority
to expropriate the property of aliens,O3 and (2) the close relationship
between confiscation and national ideology among the various nations.
A. International Consensus Regarding Expropriations
International law has been described as the body of rules, derived
from custom, treaties, and general principles of law, which have been
accepted either expressly or tacitly by the overwhelming majority of
nations.64 If this is a satisfactory definition, then the Court's claim of
61 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
62 The possibility of lawsuits over property in this country by citizens of one
foreign country against another foreign country which has expropriated their property
should not be overlooked. This type of litigation could prove most ticklish for
United States foreign relations. If both countries involved are friends of the United
States, it may be awkward for the State Department to show a preference by recom-
mending any particular result to the court. For such cases the advantages of requiring
the presence of objective indicia of animosity between this country and the expro-
priating one are clear. If no indicia of animosity are present, the court would apply
the act of state doctrine, granting judgment in favor of the expropriator. The court
would not have to discuss the relationship between the expropriation and international
law.
If, however, indicia of animosity are present, the court would have to proceed
to the merits of the case. A decision against the confiscation would not upset American
foreign policy in such a situation. A decision in favor of the expropriation, on the
other hand, could ruffle feelings in the homeland of the persons whose property has
been seized. There is at least no direct insult to that country, however, since it is
not the official act of that country which is being contested before the court. Further-
more it would probably be inequitable to allow foreigners to recover in situations
in which our courts would not allow recovery to American citizens. Throughout our
history American courts have entertained lawsuits involving aliens and concerning
all sorts of litigable issues--our foreign policy has not suffered noticeably as a result.
63 It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or con-
sensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate
it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can
then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact
rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice.
376 U.S. at 428.
64 See 1 OPPENHE-M, op. cit. sfpra note 31, §§ 5, 11, 19.
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a lack of consensus regarding expropriations was equivalent to alleging
an absence of international law prescribing bounds to what a state
might properly do in this field. However, the Court was quick to deny
such an inference. In a footnote it declared: "We do not, of course,
mean to say that there is no international standard in this area; we
conclude only that the matter is not meet for adjudication by domestic
tribunals." "' It is regrettable that the Court did not choose to explain
the meaning of this footnote more fully, since on its face it appears
inconsistent with the text of the opinion.
In support of its conclusion, the majority compared the positions
taken by Western governments, Western commentators, and certain
international tribunals, in contrast with the avowed policies of Com-
munist countries and of certain newly independent and underdeveloped
countries. This comparison demonstrates a lack of agreement on the
necessity of paying prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to
the victims of expropriations. Although many countries, including
some Communist states, have paid lip service to the concept of com-
pensation, an obligation to pay full or even substantially equivalent
compensation is not recognized in many parts of the world.66 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court correctly declined to recognize a general rule
on this point.
It is also true, as the Sabbatino majority mentioned, that many
underdeveloped nations consider the traditional postulates of inter-
national law as reflecting only the interests of the wealthy, capital-
exporting states at the expense of the nations not so fortunate.6 7  But
this simply means that to some extent the old rules are no longer
properly a part of international law, and that new rules must be de-
vised which more fairly reconcile the just interests of all nations,
regardless of their economic, cultural, social, and ideological condi-
tions-rules which have the consent, albeit tacit, of the overwhelming
majority of nations."
There were available, however, principles of law relevant to the
case at hand upon which a general consensus did exist. These relate
376 U.S. at 429 n.26.
66 In fact, Abram Chayes, the former Legal Adviser to the State Department,
stated that it was the position of the United States only to demand compensation
"that is reasonably adequate and reasonably prompt." Chayes, The Lawyer and the
Alliance for Progress, 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 192, 195 (1962). See also 1 OPPEN-
HEIM, op. cit. supra note 31, § 155d, at 352. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 862-64 (2d Cir. 1962).
6 See, e.g., Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens
a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961); 1 U.N.
INTEMRATIONAL LAW Comm'x, 1957 YaEImoox 155, 158 (A/CN. 4/SER. A/1957)
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957-V.5, Vol. 1).
68See Dawson & Weston, supra note 40, at 757.
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to the issue of discrimination by Cuba against aliens of a particular
nationality. Support can readily be found for the proposition that a
taking which discriminates against a class of people, such as aliens
of a particular nationality, is contrary to international law.69 Unlike
the case against compensation, exponents of the theory that discrimina-
tion is permitted by international authority are extremely rare.7° The
authorities cited by the Court urge no such proposition.7 In fact,
Bystricky, professor of private international law at the Charles Uni-
versity of Prague, Czechoslovakia, cited by the Court, actually con-
cludes that "international law only proscribes discrimination and
interdiction, but in no way prescribes the payment of compensation for
nationalized property." 7'
A review of Communist nationalizations supports Bystricky. In
their property-takings Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia seized
property without regard to the nationality of the owners. Each pro-
vided some form of compensation except for owners of German (or,
in the case of Czechoslovakia, Hungarian) nationality-a distinction
based on nationality certainly, but one which was an integral part of
the general settling of accounts between belligerents at the conclusion
of hostilities. International law as yet does not proscribe the con-
fiscation of enemy property nor the exacting of reparations.73  In her
nationalization Hungary repudiated all pre-August 1, 1946, contractual
69 See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 ,42
(No. 22) (1954); The Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934); Standard
Oil Tankers Cases, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 404, 419-20 (1928); RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 170 & illustration 2 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) ; Netherlands Note to Indonesia, Dec. 18, 1959, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 484,
485-87 (1960) ; United States Note to Rumania, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 408 (1948) ;
AMRICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS AND
COMMIT REPORTS 1959-1960, at 31 (1960); FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION: A STUDY
IN THE PROTECTION OF A-LIEN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1957); FRIED-
1&", EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 189-93 (1963); van Hecke, Confisca-
tion, Expropriation, and the Conflict of Laws, 4 INTERNATIONAL L.Q. 345 (1951);
Verdross, Die Niltionalisierung Niederlandischer Unterneh-mungen in Indonesien 1n
Lichte des Viilkerrechts, 6 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VooR INTERNATIONAL RECHT 278
(1959); 6 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFR VOOR INTERNATIONAL RECHT 260, 269 (1959)
(remarks of Professor Rolin) ; Affaire des Biens Britanniques Afu Maroc Espagnol,
2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 615, 647 (1925) (Britain/Spain).
70 See FATOTROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 249-51 (1962).
71 FLEmING, STATES, CONTRACTS, AND PROGRESS 62-63 (1960); Bystricky, Notes
on Certain International Legal Problems Relating to Socialist Nationalisation, in
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE Com-
MIssION ON PRivATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, IVTH CONG. 15 (1956); 1 U.N. INTER-
NATIONAL LAW Com'N, op. cit. supra note 67, at 155, 158 (remarks of Mr. Padilla
Nervo of Mexico and Mr. Pal of India); Anand, Role of the "New" Asian-African
Countries in the Present International Legal Order, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 383 (1962) ;
Doman, Postwar Nationalization of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 CoLum L. REV.
1125, 1127, 1143-58 (1948) ; Roy, supra note 67.
7 2 Bystricky, supra note 71, at 24.
73 See, e.g., Joint Resolution Terminating War, § 5, 42 Stat. 106 (1921) ; 2 Or-
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
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obligations owing to Hungarian citizens, but respected similar claims
owed to foreigners-not a discrimination against foreigners, but a
preference for them. Hungary, in accordance with her peace treaty,
also exempted from nationalization the property of the Allied Govern-
ments and their nationals. Rumania made no distinction in its
nationalization except to exempt property of a foreign state entitled to
such property under Rumania's treaty of peace or her reparation
commitment-again a distinction associated with the conclusion of
war. Bulgaria seized property of all persons regardless of nationality
except German assets in Bulgaria given to the Soviet Union by the
Allied Control Council for Germany. She provided a form of com-
pensation except for wartime enemies and persons "incriminated in
activity to restore fascism" in Bulgaria. With the possible exception
of this very last distinction, the persons in each category precluded
from compensation under the Bulgarian nationalization were so treated
because of activities connected with World War II. Furthermore, to
the extent that the compensation provided by these Eastern European
countries proved to be illusory, there was in practical effect no dis-
crimination at all.74
Elsewhere in the world expropriations have generally not been
directed toward the nationals of a particular country as such, despite
cursory appearance in certain cases. Mexico in 1938 seized only alien-
owned oil properties, but several foreign countries were involved.
When Iran nationalized its oil industry in 1951, only British interests
were involved, but no one else held similar property. In the same
way the Egyptian nationalization of the Universal Suez Maritime
Canal Company involved all foreign interests. And in 1964 the Congo
appropriated to its sole ownership all concession-granting rights within
its territory which were formerly owned jointly by the Congolese
Government and private Belgian interests.75 But there was little
evidence in any of these situations that the expropriating sovereign
74 See Doman, mpra note 71, at 1143-57.
Bystricky makes the following comment with respect to socialist nationalizations:
It follows clearly that socialist nationalisation can be regarded neither as
confiscation nor as expropriation. Confiscation has a punitive element in it,
while nationalisation is in no sense a punitive measure. It is true that at
the beginning of the socialist revolution the deprivation of property had some-
times, in certain individual cases, a repressive character, but these are extreme
cases. The property in question was in every case nationalised. The great
body of nationalisation measures cannot, consequently be judged according
to a certain number of extreme cases. Socialist nationalisation has in its
essence nothing in common with sanctions. Expropriation deals only with a
comparatively small group of people, and a comparatively unimportant number
of objects pass into State ownership. Here again the quantitative and quali-
tative difference is pronounced.
Bystricky, supra note 71, at 18.
75 N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
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was singling out any particular nationality for treatment different from
that which would have been accorded any other nationality which was
or might have been similarly situated; and, in all of the foregoing cases
except the first, there is no indication that even equivalent interests
owned by nationals of the expropriating country, had there been any,
would not have received similar treatment. 6 The nearest precedent
in recent history for Castro's seizures was the Indonesian seizure of
Dutch property in 1958 with the stipulation that no compensation
would be paid so long as the Netherlands continued to hold West
New Guinea.
77
Whether the Cuban seizures of only American property con-
stituted discrimination would depend on whether it was reasonable
and equitable under the circumstances for Cuba to respond in this
fashion against the United States' reduction of Cuba's sugar quota. I
believe that it was not. Both the American and the Cuban acts in-
volved economic coercion against the other country. However, it can
hardly be considered a violation of any recognized standard of law
for one country to decide to change its pattern of trade for any reason
satisfactory to itself. Therefore, we have a prima facie violation of
international law, so to speak, on Cuba's part following a valid exer-
cise of sovereign authority on the part of the United States. The
purported justification for the Cuban violation of international law
would thus fail.
B. Confiscation and Ideology
The Court also believed that confiscation so "touches . . . the
practical and ideological goals of the various members of the com-
munity of nations" as to render it unsuitable for adjudication by
American courts. This inference involves essentially the same con-
siderations which we have examined previously, for it was based upon
either the assumption that judicial determination would interfere with
State Department efforts in the same field or the assumption that
courts lack the skills necessary to resolve questions involving inter-
national political sensitivities. I have attempted to demonstrate in
the preceding section that a limited judicial role would not be likely
to hamper any significant foreign policy of this country. It may be
added here that an adjudication by an American court over a limited
and specific res would not bind any subsequent general claims settle-
ment reached by the State Department and the foreign government,
except as to the particular property before the court.
"6FA'rouaos, op. cit. supra note 70, at 250-51.
17 See Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAmt L. REv. 727 (1962).
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Judicial competence in this area should not be underestimated:
the courts certainly are in a better position than other agencies to
elaborate general, impartial rules which could form a body of inter-
national law.' Furthermore, the subject of confiscations is of no
greater sensitivity than espionage,79 nationality,"0 diplomatic im-
munity,"1 political crimes,"' freedom of the seas, 3 and conduct of war. 4
American courts do not fear these areas.
The problem is overstated when the field is termed politically
sensitive. It should be asked only whether adjudication in this field,
even limited by all reasonable safeguards, is likely to create political
difficulties. If domestic courts must run from all areas that touch upon
national sensitivities, this path to an international order under law is
forever foreclosed, precisely because it is problems in these very
fields with which international law must ultimately deal, and deal
effectively, if its true significance as an alternative to trial by battle is
ever to be realized. And until the day of effective international
adjudication, what path is open to us other than through domestic
courts ? s5
78 It should not be necessary at this date in our legal development to argue
in detail that courts have certain capabilities, perhaps not shared in the same
degree by the executive branches of government, to apply general legal rules,
whether international or national, in specific controversies for the protection
of private rights and the promotion of basic community objectives.
Brief for the Executive Committee of the American Branch of the International Law
Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 15, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964).
79 See United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944
(1962) ; United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
80 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325
(1939).
81 See Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States ex rel.
Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ; United States v. Rosal,
191 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1958) ; Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957), vacated and remanded per curiarn, 355 U.S. 393 (1958); Ivancevic v. Ar-
tukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 566 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
83 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
84 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
85 The remedies available outside the municipal courts to an individual in-
jured by a foreign State through a violation of international law are limited
at best. Should the individual succeed in having his claim espoused by the
State of which he is a national (which he ordinarily has no legal right to
demand), there is no international tribunal of general and mandatory juris-
diction to which his State may present the claim in the event that diplomatic
representations prove ineffectual. Moreover, international tribunals such as
the International Court of Justice ordinarily have no procedures by which
they can enforce their decisions.
CommITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, AssociATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YoRx, REPORT, A RECONSIDERATION OF THE AcT OF STATE DOCrRIxE IN UNI=TE STATES
COURTs 1-2 (1959).
Related to the foregoing propositions, the Court in Sabbatino took the position
that world conditions were now too fluid for the "patchwork approach" of formulating
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V. THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AMENDMENT
To a certain extent the congressional amendment to section
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is simply a reversal of
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. As the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee explained:
The effect of the amendment is to achieve a reversal of
presumptions. Under the Sabbatino decision, the courts
would presume that any adjudication as to the lawfulness
under international law of the act of a foreign state would
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy unless the President
says it would not. Under the amendment, the Court would
presume that it may proceed with an adjudication on the
merits unless the President states officially that such an
adjudication in the particular case would embarrass the
conduct of foreign policy."6
In several respects, however, the amendment has other sig-
nificance. First, Congress apparently accepted the Court's proposition
that the act of state doctrine was not constitutionally prescribed,817 and
further agreed with the Court in considering the act of state doctrine
a matter for federal, not state disposition. 8 The amendment speaks
of "no court in the United States" instead of "no United States court"
or "no court of the United States," an obvious attempt to reach state
as well as federal courts.
Perhaps more significantly, the amendment points to the con-
clusion that within our federal system international law will be an
aspect of federal law instead of state law. Happily, Congress did not
have to achieve its result, as the Supreme Court apparently thought it
had to, by resorting to a broad notion of federal common law. At
least for a short period, international law with respect to confiscations
can now be elaborated by the federal courts (and state courts under
federal aegis) on the basis of a direct mandate from Congress. The ap-
proach of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States 89 and Textile Workers
a body of international law and that decisions of American courts would likely appear
biased elsewhere in the world. But have not conditions appeared too fluid to the
existing generation for centuries, and are they not likely to appear so to all future
generations? Whether an opinion appears to be biased depends, at least in part, upon
the position taken by the judge. Is it inevitable that our courts will take the parochial
view, especially if ultimate review of their decisions will lie with the United States
Supreme Court?
SG S. RU. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964).
87 See 376 U.S. at 423.
88 See id. at 425; Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964).
89 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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Union v. Lincoln Mills,"° for expanding the body of federal court-made
law, has apparently arrived, albeit temporarily, in yet another area of
jurisprudence."' The amendment does not conclusively determine which
law-state or federal-is to be applied to aspects of international rela-
tions other than seizures of property. However, ultimate favor for
federalizing this area is likely portended by this legislation.
Another interesting aspect of the amendment is the extent to
which it prescribes substantive rules under the rubric of international
law. By reading together subsections (e) (1) and (e) (2) of the
statute as now amended, we discover Congress saying that inter-
national law requires "speedy compensation for such [expropriated]
property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value
thereof." 92 Under the Constitution, Congress may prescribe the laws
of the United States, and American courts must follow such dictates.
But does Congress have the authority to prescribe the rules of general
international law? As that term is used within the American consti-
tutional system, the answer would be yes; ' but beyond our shores the
answer obviously must be no. Legislative enactments, like the decisions
of domestic courts and the writings of legal seers, are only evidence
of that general customary international law which is applicable to all
nations. Thus American courts must follow what Congress has
announced to be international law, not because it is international law
in the purest sense of the term, but because it is the law of the
United States.
The amendment provides that it shall not apply in any case where
the foreign act is not contrary to international law or where title or
other rights are acquired pursuant to a letter of credit issued in good
faith before the confiscation. The conference report on this point
merely states that the conferees "amended the Senate language to pin-
point its precise effect." " Perhaps the purpose of this conference
change was to preserve to American bankers their traditional force
majeure defense in private contract law against liability on such letters
of credit. However, the first part of this proviso-the language about
acts not contrary to international law-can also apply to litigation like
that in Sabbatino where title to the confiscated property itself is the
subject matter of the dispute. Two cases can be imagined: first, where
a foreign seizure is not contrary to international law (as that term
90 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
91 See generally Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964).
92 Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(e) (1)-(2), 78 Stat. 1013.
93 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10. "
94 H.R. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1964).
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
has now been defined by Congress), but may be unenforceable here
for some other reason, such as its being contrary to the "public policy"
of the forum; and second, where the foreign act is valid and enforceable
under international law, and no other rule of decision renders it un-
enforceable here. In both cases the proviso apparently requires the
court to render judgment in favor of the foreign state (or one claiming
rights from that state) on the basis of the act of state doctrine instead
of rendering a judgment which would articulate principles of inter-
national law or public policy. However, such judicial opinions could
hardly conceal the implicit conclusions of the court that the act was
valid under international law. Therefore, there seems little reason,
at least in the second situation, to require a court to intone the act of
state doctrine.
Finally, let us suppose that a court actually does promulgate some
international law during the grace period provided by the amendment,
but that Congress then fails to renew the amendment at its expiration.
Which precedent should subsequent courts follow, Sabbatino or the
decision reached during the period of the amendment? It would seem
that Sabbatino and its rule would be resurrected, and the substantive
decision, being in a way only the interpretation of a statute, would pass
away with its generating statute.
